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Abstract: This is an essay written by Hilary Kornblith which attack Descartes‟ foundationalism 
and provides us with a new theory which is very much involved with scientific knowledge or 
empirical beliefs and it is a scientific enterprise. In this paper the main foci of my study is to 
delineate the distinction between Kornblith‟s account of naturalistic theory of knowledge and 
Descartes‟ account of foundationalistic theory of knowledge  as well as to identify which one is 
more reasonable. 
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Introduction:  
The essay of Kornblith is divided into 
three main sections. In the first section he reviews 
the Cartesian conception of epistemology as “first 
philosophy”, arguing that it is concerned with three 
questions:  
(1) What is knowledge?  
(2) How is knowledge is possible? And 
 (3) What should we do in order to attain 
knowledge?  
In section two of the essay Kornblith 
presents a naturalistic alternative to the Cartesian 
approach, and argues that it is concerned with the 
same questions although interpreted from the 
naturalistic approach.  
In Defense of Naturalized Epistemology: 
Kornblith argues that Descartes‟ 
foundationalism constitutes a unified theory that  
simultaneously answers the above three question. 
Descartes proposes that a belief counts as 
knowledge if it is either foundational or 
appropriately derived from what is foundational. 
According to Descartes, epistemology is 
conceived as “first philosophy”. In other words, the 
theory of knowledge is conceived as logically prior 
to empirical knowledge. In the context of skeptical 
doubts concerning the possibility of error, we first 
need to develop standards of belief that will 
safeguard against these. In this way epistemology 
must precede science, and also precedes empirical 
belief.  
Kornblith makes the point by arguing that 
epistemology ought to investigate the phenomenon 
of knowledge rather our epistemology ought to 
investigate the concept of knowledge.  
For example: people have a concept of 
aluminum, it is little more than a reflection of their 
ignorance about aluminum. But it does not mean 
they have enough information about aluminum. 
Because they think of aluminum as a grey metal 
but all grey metals are not aluminum and they don‟t 
know more about it because they don‟t know what 
the common characteristics of aluminum. Here 
Kornblith makes the point is by arguing that our 
concept of knowledge. Just as our concept of 
aluminum may contain mistakes and be otherwise 
inadequate in capturing the nature of aluminum, 
our concept of knowledge might fail in various 
ways of explicate the nature of knowledge. But 
then epistemology should not proceed by 
conceptual analysis alone. The alternative is to treat 
knowledge as a natural phenomenon, to be 
investigated by whatever means are available, 
including empirical means.  
Therefore, characterizing various natural 
phenomena is one of the hard-own achievements of 
science. This needs a theoretical understanding of 
the phenomenon. If it will develop, then obviously 
our naturalistic theory of knowledge will develop. 
And here what we will seek that is an adequate 
account of knowledge. 
Kornblith goes on to consider some 
naturalistic answers to the three questions of the 
Descartes foundationalism. Here the questions take 
on somewhat different meanings within the context 
of the approach being advocated. “What is 
knowledge?” becomes a question about the nature 
of knowledge as a natural phenomenon. The latter 
questions lose their connection to the project of 
answering the skeptic. They become questions 
about what cognitive and social mechanisms give 
rise to knowledge, and how we might improve 
upon these in order to better achieve our epistemic 
goals.   
Kornblith regarded about clearest case of 
knowledge, firstly, he says that the case of 
scientific knowledge are surly among the most 
clear-cut examples of knowledge we are likely to 
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find. The advance of our scientific understanding 
of the world surely marks one of the greatest 
intellectual achievements of the human species. 
The scientific understanding of the world provides 
the clearest case of knowledge as input to our 
theoretical investigation of the phenomenon. But 
again question arises that what does the theoretical 
investigation look like? 
Kornblith answers that it is just a 
psychological mechanism by which knowledge is 
produced and retained in order to see what, if 
anything, they have in common. In addition, as 
many have argued, there seems to be an important 
social element in knowledge.  
For example: social etiology-its role is 
production, retention and distribution of knowledge 
in social factor. So there are some theoretical 
unities to the phenomenon of knowledge. If there is 
no unity then the idea of knowledge is 
undetermined and it is dubious as well as not free 
from mistakes. Suppose at the level of society, 
there should be a social organization and that 
should play a constructive role in knowledge 
production. 
Hence, Kornblith follows Goldman‟s 
account of knowledge which states that knowledge 
is reliably produced true belief. It needs our 
rationality, cognitive skill, sensitivity etc. Here if 
we want to know how knowledge is possible then 
we have to know that how our cognitive equipment 
does allows for the possibility of reliably produced 
belief. Because the „criterion of reliability‟ is the 
main factor for the production of knowledge. Here 
also needed theoretical investigation that should be 
taken for the case of the production of the true 
belief.  
There are different investigations like, 
neurological, psychological, social etc. Thus the 
sensitivity of our perceptual mechanisms and the 
extent to which they natively attended to produce 
true belief. By investigating of various mechanisms 
of belief production and retention we may 
determine where we are most in need of guidance 
and what steps can be taken to give our capabilities 
and to overcome our limitation.  
Here I got that Descartes account of 
foundationalism provides us with a unified 
perspective on our three foundational 
epistemological questions. And also naturalistic 
program unified our approach to these questions as 
well.  
In the final section of the essay, Kornblith 
identifies what he believes is the central issue 
between naturalists and traditionalists. It is not 
whether empirical enquiry can have some 
relevance to some crucial questions about 
epistemology; that much is uncontroversial. The 
real issue is whether any such question lends itself 
to purely a priori investigation. This issue 
ultimately rests on how we are to conceive the 
nature of epistemological inquiry, and specifically, 
how we are to interpret our three questions? 
Traditionalists will want to interpret them in a 
Cartesian way, where empirical investigation is 
rendered inadmissible. Naturalists will want to 
interpret them in different ways, whereby empirical 
investigation is made essential.  
Conclusion 
I conclude that from my above discussion, 
there are some similarities are both are seeking of 
knowledge. Both apply the belief system for the 
production of knowledge. And there are also 
dissimilarities are, while Descartes account of 
epistemology as first philosophy, however, 
Kornblith‟s account of epistemology is very much 
a part of the scientific enterprise.  Descartes 
account applies the traditional method where as 
Kornblith applies the empirical method. From both 
Descartes‟s account and Kornblith‟s account, I 
agreed with Kornblith‟s account because it 
provides us with knowledge which is very much 
scientific so it is free from doubts as well as 
mistakes so it is a reasonable account. And I hope 
that if Descartes account of knowledge will be 
modified in some sense means the non-skeptic in 
character then it will be better than traditional 
prospective of knowledge accruing system. 
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